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INTRODUCTION
Since 1968, the threshold inquiry for determining whether the First
Amendment protected public employees from retaliation for their speech was
whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.   For1
almost forty years, courts focused on whether an employee spoke on a “matter
of public concern” and paid little attention to whether the employee spoke “as
a citizen.”  As long as their speech concerned a matter of public concern,
public employees were generally protected from retaliation if the employee’s
interest in commenting on public issues outweighed the state’s interest in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performed.2
The Supreme Court’s May 2006 decision, Garcetti v. Ceballos,3
reestablished that before balancing the interests of the employee and the state,
courts must first independently examine whether the employee spoke “as a
citizen.”   Garcetti is the first Supreme Court decision to hold that an4
employee never speaks as a citizen when speaking “pursuant to his official
duties.”   The Court, however, did not formulate a test or shed much light on5
how to determine when a public employee speaks pursuant to “official duties.”
The Court’s failure to articulate an “official duties” test has caused lower
courts to interpret Garcetti in many different, and sometimes conflicting,
ways.  While some courts have stated that Garcetti “significantly changes the
landscape”  or “profoundly alters how courts review First Amendment6
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retaliation claims,”  others have characterized it as a “narrow holding.”   Still7 8
others have cited Garcetti while seemingly ignoring the “official duties” prong
altogether.9
The lower courts’ efforts to apply Garcetti’s categorical holding to
various fact scenarios have resulted in some puzzling outcomes that seem to
have raised more questions than Garcetti purported to settle.  For example,
when public employees’ “official duties” require them to report wrongdoing,
can government employers fire them for reporting that wrongdoing merely
because they acted “pursuant to” those duties?  If so, does that not mean that
public employers could fire employees for doing their jobs correctly?  Is a
legal or ethical obligation to blow the whistle the same as an “official duty”
to do so?  If so, does this mean that government employees can be fired for
obeying the law?  Do public employees lose the right to petition the
government for redress when their “official duties” compel them to
communicate with governmental authorities?  This Note explores some of the
lower courts’ struggles in addressing these perplexing issues in the months
following Garcetti v. Ceballos.
Part I provides a background on the state of the law of First Amendment
protection from retaliation for public employees prior to Garcetti.  Part II
describes the facts of the Garcetti case and summarizes the Court’s opinion.
Part III examines some of the many lower court opinions that have relied upon
Garcetti between June of 2006 and June of 2007.  Specifically, Subpart A
analyzes a case in which speech constituted “official duties” when directed
toward a public employer, but speech on the same subject matter did not
constitute “official duties” when directed toward an elected official.  Subpart
B examines cases that contrast Garcetti’s “official duties” with legal and
ethical duties.  Subpart C discusses cases that deal with “official duties” when
public employees are required to report wrongdoing as part of their jobs.  Part
III concludes with some suggestions for lower courts and attorneys faced with
First Amendment retaliation claims for public employees.
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I.  FREE SPEECH FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PRIOR TO GARCETTI
The Supreme Court’s 1968 decision, Pickering v. Board of Education,10
set forth the balancing test for courts to apply to First Amendment retaliation
claims for public employees: “to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.”11
Pickering involved a high school teacher who lost his job after sending
a letter to a local newspaper that criticized the Board of Education’s handling
of tax proposals and its manner of allocating financial resources between the
schools’ educational and athletic programs.   The Board alleged, and the12
Supreme Court agreed, that some of the statements in Pickering’s letter were
false.   However, the Court was less concerned with the falsity of Pickering’s13
statements than it was with his constitutionally protected right to speak as a
citizen on matters of public concern.14
According to the Court, the issue of whether a school system required
additional funds was a matter of legitimate public concern, and “[o]n such a
question free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate.”   As teachers were the members of the community most likely to15
have informed opinions on how funds should be spent in schools, the Court
found it essential that they be able to speak freely on those issues without fear
of retaliation.   Therefore, the Court struck the balance in Pickering’s favor,16
holding that the school’s interest in “limiting teachers’ opportunities to
contribute to public debate was not significantly greater than its interest in
limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.”17
While Pickering discussed protection for a public employee speaking “as
a citizen on matters of public concern,” the Court did little to articulate what
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it meant to speak “as a citizen.”  However, the Court did note that “the fact of
employment [was] only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject
matter of the public communication.”   In addition, the letter was not shown18
to have impeded the teacher’s performance of his daily duties in the classroom
or the regular operation of the schools.   Presumably, the tenuous relationship19
between speech and employment, as well as the speech’s minimal effect on
job performance, were factors weighing in favor of treating Pickering “as a
citizen.”  Whether those factors survived the Garcetti ruling, however,
remains to be seen.
A decade after Pickering, the Court clarified in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District  that the First Amendment protection for public20
employees applies not only to public displays of speech but also to private
conversations between employees and their employers.   In Givhan, a school21
district terminated a teacher after she criticized the school’s racially
discriminatory policies during a series of private encounters with the school’s
principal.   Relying on Pickering, the Fifth Circuit held that the teacher’s22
speech was not protected because she complained to the principal privately
rather than expressing her views publicly.   The Supreme Court reversed,23
rejecting the view that freedom of speech was “lost to the public employee
who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to
spread his views before the public.”   However, the Court did state in a24
footnote that “[p]rivate expression . . . may . . . bring additional factors to the
Pickering calculus. . . .  [T]he employing agency’s institutional efficiency may
be threatened not only by the content of the employee’s message but also by
the time, manner, and place in which it is delivered.”   Nonetheless, it was25
clear after Givhan that an employee may still speak “as a citizen” when
addressing matters of public concern privately rather than publicly.
The Court elaborated upon Pickering’s “matter of public concern” prong
in Connick v. Myers,  holding that26
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when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in
reaction to the employee’s behavior.27
In Connick, Myers, an assistant district attorney, distributed a
questionnaire inside the office which inquired about office transfer policy,
office morale, the need for a grievance committee, whether employees had
confidence in particular named superiors, and whether they felt pressure to
work in political campaigns.   In considering whether the questionnaire items28
addressed matters of public concern, the court stated that the issue “must be
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed
by the whole record.”   Applying this test, the Court held that with one29
exception, the questionnaire did not touch upon matters of public concern, but
rather upon matters of personal interest.   On the other hand, the Court found30
that the question on feeling pressured to work in political campaigns did
address a matter of public concern.   However, the Court struck the Pickering31
balance in favor of the government, finding that there was “little First
Amendment interest” in protecting what was essentially an “employee
grievance concerning internal office policy.”32
After Connick clarified that the First Amendment does not protect public
employees from retaliation when their speech addresses matters of purely
personal interest, courts did not apply the Pickering balancing test until after
first determining that the employee spoke on a “matter of public concern.”33
It was not until Garcetti, however, that the Supreme Court definitively stated
that courts must separately address whether the employee speaks “as a citizen”
before weighing the interests of the state and the employee.
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44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) provides, in relevant part,
[E]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
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party injured . . . .
II.  GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS34
A.  Facts and Procedural History of Garcetti
Richard Ceballos worked as a calendar deputy district attorney for the
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office.   In February 2000, a defense35
attorney alerted Ceballos of inaccuracies in a sheriff’s affidavit that was used
to obtain a search warrant.   After visiting the location described on the36
affidavit, Ceballos determined that the affidavit contained “serious
misrepresentations.”   When Ceballos received an unsatisfactory explanation37
from the warrant affiant, he sent a memorandum to his supervisors which
explained his concerns and recommended dismissal of the case.   A few days38
later, Ceballos sent another memo that described a second conversation with
the affiant.39
At an allegedly “heated” meeting between Ceballos, his supervisors, the
warrant affiant, and other sheriff’s department employees, one lieutenant
sharply criticized Ceballos’s handling of the case.   Later, Ceballos testified40
at a hearing on the defense’s motion to traverse the warrant.   The court41
rejected the challenge to the warrant, and the District Attorney’s Office
proceeded with the prosecution.42
Thereafter, the office reassigned Ceballos’s position from calendar deputy
to trial deputy, transferred him to another courthouse, and denied him a
promotion.   Ceballos sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983  in the United States43 44
District Court for the Central District of California asserting that employees
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of the District Attorney’s Office violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution by retaliating against him
based on the speech contained in his first memo.45
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding
that Ceballos was not entitled to First Amendment protection for the memo’s
contents because he wrote the memo “pursuant to his employment duties.”46
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Ceballos’s
memo involved a “matter of public concern”; namely, governmental
misconduct.   Without considering whether Ceballos wrote the memo in his47
capacity as a citizen, the Ninth Circuit proceeded directly to the Pickering
balancing test, striking the balance in Ceballos’s favor.48
B.  The Supreme Court’s Reversal
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment, holding that “when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.”   In other words, “[r]estricting49
speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen.”50
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found the “controlling factor”
in Ceballos’s case to be that his expressions were made “pursuant to his duties
as a calendar deputy.”   Because Ceballos conceded in his brief that he51
prepared the memorandum “pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor,”  the Court52
had “no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the
scope of an employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious
debate.”   Nonetheless, the Court did note that “[t]he proper inquiry is a53
practical one.”54
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As illustrated below in Part III, the Court’s failure to formulate a test as
to what constitutes “official duties” has generated much confusion in the
lower courts.  However, the Court did provide some guidance on what
“pursuant to official duties” does not mean.
First, the Court stated that it was not dispositive “[t]hat Ceballos
expressed his views inside his office, rather than publicly.   Recognizing that55
“[m]any citizens do much of their talking inside their respective
workplaces,”  the Court was unwilling to hold that all speech at work is56
automatically stripped of First Amendment protection.57
In addition, the Court found it nondispositive that “[t]he memo concerned
the subject matter of Ceballos’ employment.”   Later in the opinion, the Court58
contrasted Ceballos’s memo with the letter in Pickering, which “had no
official significance and bore similarities to letters submitted by numerous
citizens every day.”   In other words, although Pickering’s letter concerned59
the subject matter of his employment, he did not write the letter pursuant to
his official duties.  The “official significance” of Ceballos’s memo, rather than
its focus on his job, was what rendered the memo outside the scope of First
Amendment protection.
Also, the Court stated that an employee’s formal job description is
“neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is
within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First Amendment
purposes.”   Therefore, the Court rejected “the suggestion that employers can60
restrict employees’ rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions.”61
Today, federal district courts and courts of appeals continue to face the
challenge of interpreting what this decision means—or does not mean—for
public employers and their employees, and how it affects—or does not
affect—prior precedent on First Amendment protection for public employees.
Part III, below, discusses a small fraction of the cases decided under Garcetti
v. Ceballos,  selected for illustrative purposes to demonstrate how the Court’s62
failure to create an “official duties” test has impacted courts’ analyses of First
Amendment retaliation claims.
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III.  FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIMS AFTER GARCETTI
Employees Address Their Speech Internally or Externally
A.  Freitag v. Ayers:  “Official Duties” as a Function of Whether Public63
Prior to Garcetti, a jury in the Northern District of California determined
that a female prison guard was entitled to First Amendment protection for
reporting sexually abusive inmate behavior to various authorities.   However,64
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration
of the verdict in light of Garcetti because the trial judge instructed the jury to
consider speech that, after Garcetti, was not protected.65
1.  Facts of Freitag
On several occasions, Deanna Freitag, a correctional officer for the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), reported to
CDCR officials several instances of inmates openly masturbating in front of
her.   In addition, she filed a formal complaint with the California Department66
of Fair Employment and Housing and wrote letters to a state senator, alleging
that she had been harassed and that her employers had retaliated against her
and failed to take appropriate correctional measures.   Her letters to the67
senator resulted in an investigation by the California Office of Inspector
General, which revealed that her allegations were true.   Before the Inspector68
General issued its report, however, the CDCR determined that Freitag had
made false accusations and terminated her.69
The jury found that several CDCR employees retaliated against Freitag
in violation of her First Amendment rights.   The district judge’s instructions70
included as examples of free speech her communications with her employer
and the state senator as well has her cooperation in the Inspector General’s
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investigation.   On appeal, the defendants argued that, under Garcetti, Freitag71
did not speak “as a citizen” in any instance.72
The Ninth Circuit found that even after Garcetti, Freitag’s
communications with the senator and the Inspector General were protected
because “[h]er right to complain both to an elected public official and to an
independent state agency is guaranteed to any citizen in a democratic society
regardless of his status as a public employee.”   The court noted that, under73
Garcetti, Freitag did not contact the government officials “pursuant to [her]
official duties,” she did not lose rights simply because she was speaking about
the subject matter of her employment, and her letters “‘bore similarities to
letters submitted by numerous citizens every day.’”74
The court, however, determined that, with respect to Freitag’s internal
complaints, “it is clear that, under Ceballos, such activity is not
constitutionally protected. . . .  Freitag submitted those reports pursuant to her
official duties as a correctional officer and thus not in her capacity as a
citizen.”   Determining that the relevant instruction permitted the jury to75
consider some unprotected speech, the court remanded to the district court the
question of whether the jury instruction was “more probably than not
harmless.”76
With respect to Freitag’s letter to the Director of the CDCR, the court was
“unsure whether prison guards are expected to air complaints . . . all the way
up to the Director of the CDCR at the state capitol in Sacramento.”   The77
Ninth Circuit found that the district court was in a better position to make the
relevant factual determinations and remanded the issue of whether that
particular letter was protected.78
On remand, the district court held that Freitag did not write her letter to
the Director of the CDCR pursuant to her official duties.   Although the79
director represented the third level in the employee grievance process, the
court found that the letter was not part of any “grievance.”   According to the80
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court, there was no evidence that “Freitag was in any way required by her
official job duties to raise her concerns with [the director], even if she had the
right to do so as part of the grievance process after first attempting resolution
with her immediate supervisor and with the warden.”   Moreover, Freitag did81
not ask for any specific remedy for herself, such as a reassignment, but rather
referenced the CDCR’s obligations to the public.   In addition, the court82
pointed to Freitag’s decision not to use official stationery and her use of her
own home address as evidence that she did not write the letter pursuant to her
official duties.83
With respect to the jury verdict, the district court determined that the
inclusion in the jury instructions of examples of unprotected speech
constituted harmless error.   In other words, the court was “confident that the84
jury would more probably than not have reached the same verdict had the jury
only considered Freitag’s letters to [the director and the senator] and her
written and oral communications with the Office of the Inspector General.”85
2.  Analysis
While the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the First Amendment
protects communications to elected officials appears to be consistent with
Garcetti, it is questionable whether the court’s analysis of the internal
complaints had any basis in precedent.  Without much explanation, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that it was “clear” that preparing internal forms was not
protected under the First Amendment.   However, the Ninth Circuit’s holding86
failed to account for prior precedent that public employees do not lose their
First Amendment protection merely because they express their grievances
internally rather than externally.  The Court made this clear in Givhan,  and87
again in Garcetti,  when it stated that it was nondispositive that Ceballos88
expressed his views inside the office.   A similar concern arises with respect89
to the Ninth Circuit’s remand to the district court for a factual determination
of whether Freitag was expected to “air” her complaints all the way to the
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director level.  In other words, the Ninth Circuit was unsure whether that
complaint was “external” enough to fall within First Amendment protection.
In addition, it is far from “clear” what part of Freitag’s job duties required
her to be subjected to sexual harassment, let alone to report it.  In extending
Freitag’s prison guard duties to include reporting any sexual harassment that
she may experience, the Ninth Circuit seems dangerously close to violating
Garcetti’s rejection of overly broad job descriptions.   Further, even if Freitag90
were obligated to report sexual harassment by inmates, it is all the more
curious that the government could constitutionally retaliate against her for
doing exactly what she was supposed to do.
If the Ninth Circuit was concerned with the disruptive effect Freitag’s
complaints could have had on the efficient operation of the prison, it could
have addressed this issue by using the Pickering balancing test rather than by
categorically precluding internal complaints from First Amendment
protection.  Moreover, Freitag is not a case in which a public employee was
unjustifiably disruptive in making frivolous claims.  To the contrary, the
Inspector General’s investigation revealed that Freitag’s allegations of inmate
misconduct were true.   Further, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding91
that the CDCR, along with the prison inmates, did in fact create a hostile work
environment because of Freitag’s sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.   The Ninth Circuit also found that sexual harassment was a matter92
of public concern.   Therefore, the effect of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in93
Freitag is to strip all internal grievances of First Amendment protection,
regardless of their truth or importance.
On remand, the district court faced the task of separating the
“unprotected” speech from the protected speech.  Since the court held that
Freitag’s speech to the Director of the CDCR was protected,  and that it was94
more probable than not that the jury would have reached the same verdict if
it had not considered instances of unprotected speech,  Freitag ultimately95
prevailed.  However, if any factually similar cases arise in which the public
employee only complained internally or to someone higher up in the chain of
command, courts under the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction will be bound by
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Freitag to hold that such speech does not receive First Amendment protection
as a matter of law.
B.  Official Duties versus Legal and Ethical Duties
In his dissent to Garcetti, Justice Breyer pointed out that Ceballos had
both the professional and constitutional obligation to “learn of, to preserve,
and to communicate with the defense about exculpatory and impeachment
evidence in the government’s possession.”   Nevertheless, the majority found96
that Ceballos’s speech was not protected because he spoke pursuant to his
official duties.  The Court’s failure to accord protection to Ceballos’s speech
notwithstanding his professional and constitutional obligations to speak might
suggest that the First Amendment does not protect speech compelled by legal
or ethical duties when a job duty places an additional obligation to utter the
same speech.  At least two district courts, however, have held otherwise.
1.  Cheek v. City of Edwardsville97
According to the District of Kansas, a legal duty is not necessarily the
same as an official duty.   Jeffrey Cheek, a Major in the Police Department98
of the City of Edwardsville, Kansas, informed the Attorney General’s Office
when he discovered that various city officials had protected their friends from
criminal charges.   As a result, Cheek lost his job and alleged First99
Amendment retaliation.   The defendants argued that, after Garcetti, Cheek’s100
speech to the Attorney General was not protected because he “had a duty
under Kansas law to report any official misconduct by city officials because
he would have been guilty of the felony of concealing evidence of a crime . . .
if he had not reported the corruption.”101
The court rejected the defendants’ contention, stating that “the Supreme
Court in Garcetti was concerned with speech that occurs in the course of an
employee’s official employment duties, not within the scope of other legal
obligations or duties.”   Therefore, the court denied the defendants’ motion102
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to dismiss for failure to state a claim and allowed Cheek to prove that his
speech to the Attorney General was outside his official duties.103
2.  Shewbridge v. El Dorado Irrigation District104
Scott Shewbridge worked as a senior engineer for the Water Division of
the El Dorado Irrigation District (EID) in California.   Shewbridge believed105
that EID’s mismanagement of water resources could lead to environmental
damage, water shortages, and a complete unavailability of water.   Among106
other activities, Shewbridge reported his concerns to the Department of Fish
and Game, the State Water Board, the Department of Health Services, and the
California Attorney General’s Office.   He also participated in a public water107
conference, gave a Sierra Club presentation regarding water supply, wrote
letters to the editor, had discussions with reporters regarding his concerns
about water supply and demand issues, and participated in a citizen’s water
advisory group.   After a series of formal and informal disciplinary108
proceedings, EID fired Shewbridge, allegedly because of attitude problems.109
Shewbridge brought a First Amendment retaliation claim in the District
Court for the Eastern District of California.   Relying on Shewbridge’s110
testimony that he had a professional obligation as an engineer to report
wrongdoing and to respond to potential dangers to the public, the defendants
contended that he made his speech in the context of his employment.   The111
court rejected the defendants’ argument that Shewbridge’s “obligation as a
professional engineer is inseparable from his obligation as an employee of
EID because he was hired by EID to work as an engineer.”   That is,112
Shewbridge’s testimony that the California Code of Regulations governing
engineers imposed upon him, by law, an ethical obligation to report
wrongdoing was not an admission that such reporting was within his job
duties.113
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The court found that, unlike Garcetti, Shewbridge presented a factual
dispute as to whether the plaintiff spoke pursuant to his official duties.114
Resolving the factual dispute in favor of Shewbridge, the court denied the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.115
3.  Analysis
Unlike Ceballos, Shewbridge and Cheek addressed their concerns
externally rather than inside the office.  As noted above, however, both
Givhan and Garcetti made clear that public employees do not lose First
Amendment protection merely because they choose to speak internally.116
Therefore, in order to reconcile Shewbridge and Cheek with Garcetti, there
must be some other distinction between the cases.
Notably, the Eastern District of California distinguished Shewbridge from
Garcetti because Shewbridge presented a factual dispute as to whether the
plaintiff spoke pursuant to his official duties.   Perhaps the critical difference117
between the cases is that Shewbridge and Cheek did not stipulate that they
spoke pursuant to their official duties whereas Ceballos did.   If that is the118
case, it is possible that, in the absence of Ceballos’s concession, the Supreme
Court might have held that his independent constitutional and professional
obligations rendered his speech outside of his official duties, or at least might
have remanded the case for such a determination.  Because Garcetti left the
question of the legal-versus-official duty dichotomy unanswered, lower courts
have been free to reach their own conclusions on whether or not a legal duty
can ever be distinct from an official duty.
C.  Legal Obligations Plus Employment Obligations: Legal Compliance
Jobs
At least two courts of appeals have found that, in the context of jobs that
require public employees to advise their employers about compliance with
applicable laws, legal duties are indistinguishable from official duties.
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1.  Battle v. Board of Regents119
i.  Facts
As a financial aid counselor at Fort Valley State University, Lillie
Battle’s job included verifying the completion and accuracy of student files
as well as reporting any perceived fraudulent activity.   In reviewing student120
files previously assigned to her supervisor, Jeanette Huff, Battle discovered
that Huff was “falsifying information, awarding financial aid to ineligible
recipients, making excessive awards, and forging documents.”   Battle121
alerted Huff, as well as the president and vice president of the university of the
“improprieties” and was later terminated despite a positive evaluation.122
Believing that she lost her job because of her attempts to expose Huff’s fraud,
Battle provided the Department of Education with documents suggesting
potential fraud.   As a result, the Georgia Department of Audits investigated123
and found “serious noncompliance with federal regulations and risk factors for
fraud,” confirming Battle’s allegations.124
Battle filed suit, alleging that she was discharged in violation of the First
Amendment.   The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the125
district court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants, reasoning that
Battle admitted that she had a “clear employment duty to ensure the accuracy
and completeness of student files as well as to report any mismanagement or
fraud she encountered.”   In addition, the court noted that the Department of126
Education guidelines required all financial aid workers to report suspected
fraud.   Therefore, “[b]y Plaintiff’s own admission and in the light of federal127
guidelines,” Battle’s speech was made pursuant to her official duties.128
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ii.  Analysis
In other words, the government could constitutionally fire Battle for
reporting suspected fraud notwithstanding the fact that she was required both
by law and her job to report it.  Battle, like many public employees after
Garcetti, faced termination both for not reporting the fraud and for reporting
the fraud.  Notably, Battle was correct in her suspicions of fraud, as revealed
by the Department of Audits’ investigation.  This was not a case in which her
employers were justified in firing her because she performed her “official
duties” poorly.  Rather, they fired her because they were dissatisfied with the
results of the proper execution of her official duties.
It is questionable whether the Supreme Court would sanction the notion
that public employees could be fired for doing their jobs correctly.  Garcetti
does not dictate such a result, because there was no indication in the Court’s
opinion that Ceballos was correct in his suspicions about the warrant.  To the
contrary, the trial court denied the challenge to the warrant,  making it at129
least somewhat more likely that Ceballos’s concerns were unfounded.  While
it may seem unfair that the district attorney’s office could retaliate against
Ceballos despite a good-faith belief that the warrant contained errors, lower
courts are now bound by that decision.  Courts are, however, still free to reject
the idea that public employers have unchecked discretion to fire their
employees for speech uttered in the course of correctly performing their jobs.
2.  Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School District130
i.  Facts
Barbara Casey was the Superintendent of the West Las Vegas
Independent School District.   One of her duties as superintendent was131
serving as CEO of Head Start, a federally-funded program that provided
educational opportunities, meals, and healthcare to low-income children
between the ages of three and five.   The Head Start Director, Jacqueline132
Padilla, informed Casey of evidence that as many as fifty percent of the
families enrolled in Head Start had incomes that were too high to qualify for
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participation.   Casey reported the problem several times to various school133
board members, all of whom responded that she should not worry about it.134
Given the board’s inaction, Casey felt that “she had a duty as Head Start’s
executive director to report this wrong doing [sic] to federal authorities.”135
Therefore, Casey directed Padilla to report her findings to the Head Start
regional office.   As a result, the United States Department of Health and136
Human Services determined that some of the enrollments in the program were
improper and ordered repayment of more than half a million dollars in federal
aid.137
Later, Casey informed the board that it violated the New Mexico Open
Meetings Act by making decisions without proper notice and meeting
agendas.   When the defendants ignored her warnings, Casey filed a138
complaint with the New Mexico Attorney General’s office.   The Attorney139
General determined that the board had, in fact, violated the Open Meetings
Act.140
Moreover, Casey informed the board that she believed that the school
district violated state or federal laws by hiring employees without advertising
vacancies or conducting a review process and improperly handling a case in
which a teacher and a principal had an affair.   Thereafter, Casey was141
subsequently demoted and eventually terminated.142
Casey alleged that the defendants retaliated against her for exercising her
First Amendment rights.   After the district court denied the defendants143
summary judgment, the Supreme Court handed down Garcetti.   Because144
Garcetti “significantly modified” the first prong of the Pickering balancing
test, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether Casey
provided evidence that she spoke as a citizen and not pursuant to her official
duties.145
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As to her communications with the board concerning their potential
violations of federal and state law, Casey conceded that this category of
statements was barred as a matter of law.   The court agreed that the146
statements fell within the scope of her duties because they were “aimed solely
to the [s]chool [b]oard,” and her job included advising defendants “about the
lawful and proper way to conduct school business.”   However, as discussed147
below, it is questionable whether the First Amendment does or should
categorically preclude these types of statements.
With respect to Casey’s comments to the school board about the lack of
compliance with federal regulations on the Head Start program, the Tenth
Circuit stated, “we cannot help but conclude that Ms. Casey made these
statements pursuant to her official duties.”   As the comments “were directed148
only to her supervisors and . . . sought to raise concerns about the legality of
the [d]istrict’s operations,” the court held that she was again acting pursuant
to her duty of advising the board how to lawfully conduct school business.149
The court also found that Casey spoke pursuant to her official duties in
contacting federal authorities about the Head Start income-reporting issues.150
Before Garcetti, the defendants argued that Casey acted ultra vires and in a
disruptive manner, while Casey argued that she had a duty to report
wrongdoing.   After Garcetti, however, the parties switched positions; the151
defendants alleged that Casey acted within her job duties, while Casey alleged
that she acted purely as a citizen.   The court agreed with the defendants’152
new position that Casey acted “pursuant to her official duties” because she
acknowledged in a deposition that “she would be held legally responsible for
having knowledge of something that was wrong and not reporting that.”   In153
addition, the court stated that the fact that Casey directed a subordinate to
report to Head Start officials buttressed the conclusion that she acted “in
accordance with, if not compelled by, her office.”154
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The court, however, held that Casey’s statements to the Attorney General
were not made pursuant to her official duties.   Therefore, she was not155
fulfilling her responsibility of advising the school board, but “[j]ust the
opposite: she had lost faith that the [b]oard would listen to her advice so she
took her grievance elsewhere.”   Because there was no evidence that Casey156
had the responsibility of overseeing the board’s meeting practices, her conduct
“fell sufficiently outside the scope of her office to survive even the force of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti.”157
ii.  Analysis
A few complications arise from the court’s logic in Casey.  First,
constitutional protection is dependent upon the circumstances in which the
speech is made.  Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Freitag, the exact
same statement could be protected in one instance and not protected the next,
and the only discernable distinction is that some speech is internal and other
speech is external.  While the context in which a public employee makes a
statement does make a difference for purposes of balancing the interests of the
speaker and the public employer,  there does not appear to be a compelling158
reason for summarily rejecting internal speech without a fact-sensitive inquiry.
In other words, the Pickering balancing test is sufficient for determining
which internal speech is protected and which is not.
On a related note, the court found that Casey’s speech was protected
when she did “[j]ust the opposite” of what her official duties dictated.   This159
suggests that public employees are better off ignoring internal grievance
procedures and running straight to high government officials or the media with
any complaints they might have.  Regardless of whether the Court intended
such a result, Justice Stevens appears to have been correct in his dissenting
opinion in Garcetti that the Court fashioned “a new rule that provides
employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking
frankly to their superiors.”160
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Determining whether a public employee spoke pursuant to “official
duties” may seem like an unnecessary hurdle for both courts and employees
alike.  For the past forty years, the Pickering balancing test weeded out
meritless claims.  First, the employee’s speech had to address a matter of
public concern.  In other words, the First Amendment did not protect matters
of purely personal interest.   In addition, courts were afforded the flexibility161
of a balancing test that allowed them to weigh the employee’s interest in
exercising free speech rights against the state’s interest in efficiently running
its operations.   Therefore, the Court could have reached the same result in162
Garcetti by holding that the state’s interest in operating the district attorney’s
office without disruption outweighed Ceballos’s interest in recommending
dismissal of the case.  Instead, it chose to categorically bar from First
Amendment protection all speech uttered pursuant to “official duties,” without
giving much guidance as to what “official duties” means.
However unreasonably broad-sweeping or complicated the “official
duties” element may appear, lower courts are now bound by the Supreme
Court’s decision.  One way to make the most of this confusing situation is to
read Garcetti as narrowly as possible.
For example, lower courts should keep in mind the three caveats the
Court mentioned in articulating what the “official duties” test does not mean.
That is, (1) a formal job description is neither necessary nor sufficient for
ascertaining official duties, (2) the fact that Ceballos’s speech was made in the
office rather than publicly was not dispositive, and (3) the fact that Ceballos’s
speech dealt with the subject matter of his employment was not dispositive.163
These three limitations can substantially confine a court’s ability to hold that
speech was uttered pursuant to official duties.
It is also critical for lower courts to recognize that Ceballos stipulated that
he spoke pursuant to his official duties.   As discussed in the analysis of164
Shewbridge and Cheek,  the Court might well have reached a different result165
had Ceballos not made this concession.  Whether it was fair for the Court to
hold Ceballos to that concession when he had little reason to know that it
would be fatal to his case is a separate issue.  What is important for courts
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relying on Garcetti is to follow the course taken in Shewbridge and Cheek and
to recognize that absent a stipulation, there will often be a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether an employee spoke pursuant to his official duties.
In addition, lower courts should make decisions in light of public policy
concerns; courts should be especially sensitive to the “matter of public
concern” of exposing governmental wrongdoing and should not be too quick
to conclude that the public employee did not speak “as a citizen” in disclosing
that wrongdoing either internally or externally.  Although the examination of
whether speech addressed “a matter of public concern” and whether the
employee spoke “as a citizen” are two independent inquiries, it is possible that
some subjects are so vital to the public interest that public employees’
obligations as citizens, rather than their obligations as employees, compel
them to speak on those subjects.  In other words, even when public employees
have an “official duty” related to the speech, they do not necessarily speak
“pursuant to” that duty.  As Justice Souter discussed in his dissent in Garcetti,
whistleblower laws are not always enough to provide public employees the
protection they deserve in exposing corruption within government.166
Therefore, keeping in mind that governmental wrongdoing is generally a
matter of public concern, courts should remain open to the possibility that
public employees may be motivated as citizens, rather than as public
employees, to speak about those issues.
Finally, lower courts should remember that the inquiry of whether or not
an employee spoke pursuant to “official duties” is a “practical one.”167
Sometimes, in order to recognize that it is both unfair and inconsistent with
prior precedent to strip a public employee of First Amendment protection
when he or she has a legal or ethical obligation to disclose the wrongdoing of
public officials, all it takes is common sense.
